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INFORMATION SYSTEMS OUTSOURCING:  









In this article, we apply transaction cost theory (TCT) and institutional theory to the realm of IS 
outsourcing.  TCT posits that firm’s outsourcing governance is influenced by transaction cost 
factors, namely, bounded rationality, opportunism, and risk.  Institutional theory, on the other 
hand, has been advocated to explain non-choice behavior of organizations in the context of 
competitors, norms, and professional associations.  Although TCT has been used extensively in 
the extant literature to study outsourcing arrangements, we argue that as IS outsourcing practices 
propagate in organizational fields, TCT explanations will take a back seat to institutional 
explanations.  We appropriate the transaction cost framework to the IS outsourcing setting and 
consider when and how firm’s decision to adopt outsourcing and corresponding ex-ante 
screening and ex-post monitoring of the vendor will be influenced by mimetic, normative, and 
coercive institutional pressures.  More specifically, we argue that greater the density and rate of 
adoption in outsourcing during innovation diffusion and stability stages, the greater the possibility 
that transaction cost factors will be replaced by institutional factors in explaining firms’ 
governance structures (decision to adopt outsourcing, and corresponding screening and 
monitoring).  Conversely, we posit that when the institutional pressures are relatively weak, TCT 
better explains the intricacies of IS outsourcing arrangements.  In conclusion, future research 
directions and managerial implications of the institutional environment on IS outsourcing 
governance are discussed. 
Keywords: information systems outsourcing, transaction cost theory, institutional theory 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The importance of information systems (IS) outsourcing is well documented.  According to the 
Gartner group, the global software outsourcing is estimated to reach $260 billion by 2009.  
Outsourcing is argued to reduce software development costs and time, provide access to new 
technology, and improve business performance by enabling firms to concentrate on their core 
competencies [Bryson and Ngwenyama 2006; Dhar and Balakrishnan 2006; DiRomualdo and 
Gurbaxani 1998; Lacity and Willcocks 1998; Lee 2006; Levina and Ross 2003; Murthy 2004; 
Smith et al. 1998; Willcocks and Lacity 1998].   
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In this article, we focus on IS outsourcing1 and use transaction cost and institutional theories to 
understand firm’s outsourcing governance structures.2  We chose transaction cost theory (TCT) 
because it has been applied extensively in discussing outsourcing relationships [e.g., Ang and 
Straub 1998; Carmel and Nicholson 2005; Choudhury and Sampler 1997; Clemons et al. 1993; 
Grover et al. 1996, 1998; Miranda and Kim 2006; Poppo and Zenger 1998; Steensma and Corley 
2001; Willcocks and Cacity 1998].  Further support for the extent of TCT application in IT 
outsourcing research is provided by Klein [2002] who observed that the majority of scholars have 
adopted TCT as the primary theoretical basis for studying IS outsourcing.  For example, in a book 
edited by Willcocks and Lacity [1998], Grover and colleagues highlight how transaction cost 
factors such as opportunism influence outsourcing governance (e.g., monitoring).  However, in 
certain instances, TCT alone has failed to explain some outsourcing behavior.  For example, 
Miranda and Kim [2006] did not find support for the position that bounded rationality impacts level 
of outsourcing.  While institutional theory could possibly explain certain disparities in the 
application of TCT, most of the extant literature has ignored the institutional explanations of IS 
issues in general and outsourcing in particular [with the exceptions of Ang and Cummings 1997; 
Jayatilaka 2002; King et al. 1994; Miranda and Kim 2006; Teo et al. 2003].  Recently, several 
scholars have highlighted the importance of accounting for the institutional context in 
interorganizational relationships [Granovetter 1985; Grewal and Dharwadkar 2002; Miranda and 
Kim 2006; Teo et al. 2003; Uzzi 1996].  While many other theories such as agency and resource-
based could be employed to complement TCT, we chose institutional theory because we wanted 
to focus on non-choice behavior in IT outsourcing that is lacking in many rational theoretical 
explanations to organizational behavior.  
Firm’s outsourcing governance structures are predominantly influenced by bounded rationality, 
opportunism, and risk characteristics [Chiles and McMackin 1996; Jones and Hill 1988; Miranda 
and Kim 2006; Williamson 1985].  TCT identifies two key governance costs that arise as a result 
of these transaction cost factors (e.g., opportunism) [Chaudhury et al. 1995; Chiles and 
McMackin 1996; Dyer 1997; Grover et al. 1998; Jones and Hill 1988].  First, due to the 
information asymmetry, the firm has to expend resources in screening3 vendors.  Second, due to 
possible goal conflicts, outsourcing firms have to expend considerable amount of resources to 
monitor4 the vendor.  In firms securing outsourcing contracts with vendors, screening represents 
ex-ante contracting costs while monitoring represents ex-post contracting costs.5  Accordingly, in 
a dominantly rational, efficiency-based perspective such as TCT, transaction cost factors 
                                                     
1 Outsourcing is the practice in which a firm delegates a vendor to carry out some task because 
the firm is unable or unwilling to do the task by itself.  By IS outsourcing, we mean any type of 
information technology outsourcing including outsourcing of software development, data centers 
or the entire IS function. 
2 In governance structures, we include firm’s decision to adopt outsourcing and corresponding 
screening and monitoring of the vendor. 
3 Screening refers to all the activities of communication, search and evaluation the firm 
undertakes with the ultimate goal of finding a suitable vendor.  Example screening activities 
include interviewing vendors, survey of vendors’ existing customers, and call for Requests for 
Proposals (RFP). 
4 Monitoring refers to any collection of information by the firm, for either supporting direct 
incentives or setting limits on the vendor’s behavior.  Monitoring can be classified into two types 
of auditing activities: financial audits (e.g., consulting fees) and operational audits (e.g., site visits 
by the firm, examination of design documents and reports). 
5 By contract, we mean any legally binding contractual agreement between the firm and a vendor.   
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bounded rationality, opportunism, and risk will influence the firm’s decision to adopt outsourcing 
and related screening and monitoring of the vendor.6  
Nonetheless, although Klein [2002] and others have observed that a majority of extant literature 
adopts TCT as the key theoretical lens to studying outsourcing, anecdotal and research evidence 
suggests that TCT may not be the predominant factor in explaining governance structures in all 
outsourcing situations.  For an example, the American Banking Association (ABA), the premier 
professional organization for more than 6000 banks in the U.S. not only endorses IS service 
providers but also provides vendors’ client listings to member banks [aba.com].  Consequently, 
potential clients may overlook structuring optimal contracts with service providers by using 
standard practices and ABA endorsed service providers in IS outsourcing.  Jayatilaka [2002] and 
Miranda and Kim [2006] provide research support as to how institutional settings could impact 
outsourcing governance. 
In order to understand such deviations from the TCT perspective, we appropriate concepts from 
institutional theory and apply them to the IS outsourcing domain.  According to institutional theory, 
organizations and their relationships with others are subject to pressures from the institutional 
environment that force them to conform to institutionalized norms, beliefs and taken-for-granted 
practices [DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Oliver 1991, 1997a; Teo et al. 2003].  We argue that, in 
many instances, mimetic, normative, and coercive pressures emanating from firms’ institutional 
environments influence outsourcing7.  In uncertain environments, organizations often use non-
economic bases for making organizational decisions by mimicking other organization, by making 
decisions based on professional codes of conducts, or more instinctively, through reflexes based 
on some deeper cognitive mechanisms which they take for granted.  Mimicking other 
organizations often results from mimetic pressures that arise from direct interpersonal ties among 
executives who serve on interlocked boards, and hence mimic the interlocked organization and/or 
from indirect pressure arising from structural equivalence within organizational fields wherein 
organizations mimic other successful organizations that they consider to be similar to them 
[DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Galakiewicz and Burt 1991].  Normative pressures originate from 
sources such as professional associations and educational systems [Davis 1991; DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983].  Unlike mimetic pressures, the underlying bases of normative pressures are 
perhaps deeper and not so obvious.  As professions (like accounting) and industries (like 
banking) evolve, they standardize the code of conduct based on requirements of the educational 
systems that provide them with continued supply of professionals and through professionalization 
and standardization.  Consequently, highly normed industries have collectivization of organization 
action due to the standardization of decision making that result in such actions.  The last set of 
institutional pressures is termed coercive pressures, and they emanate from absolute regulatory 
directives or result from technological changes that compel the focal organization to make 
changes rapidly [Tushman and Anderson 1986].8  When such immediate legal pressures arise 
                                                     
6 Adoption in this context refers to a firm’s decision to outsource a particular IS technology. 
7 We refer readers to DiMaggio and Powell [1983, p. 150-154] for a more extensive discussion on 
mimetic, normative and coercive pressures.  Mimetic pressures refer to those that force firms to 
adopt practices of similar and more successful firms in order to cope with uncertainly of an 
emerging technology or a new process.  Normative pressures refer to those that force firms to 
adopt practices of professionalization mainly to achieve legitimacy from its customers and 
suppliers.  Finally, coercive pressures refer to those that originate externally forcing firms to alter 
established practices.  Although as DiMaggio and Powell envisioned coercive pressures to 
primarily emanate from regulatory mandates, with respect to the IS outsourcing context, we 
consider coercive pressure to stem from technological changes. 
8 In the classical institutional theory literature, coercive pressures generally manifest from 
government regulations or mandates.  However, in a market economy, coercive pressures that 
impact existing outsourcing “cycles” emerge from technology changes.  Such technology changes 
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(e.g, Sarbanes Oxley Act and the audit profession), organizations are often left with little recourse 
than to comply with the directives.  However, in some instances, such pressures may be more 
subtle and the organizational reactions to them may not be instantaneous as in the case of some 
technology-induced changes.   
In addition to these pressures, institutional theorists also concur that the process of 
institutionalization follows a path in which there is (1) an early phase of acceptance of an 
innovation followed by diffusion; (2) a middle phase of stability; and (3) in some instances, a final 
stage involving de-legitimizing [Lawrence et al. 2001; Tolbert and Zucker 1999; Zucker 1977].  
Hence, the nature and extent of institutional pressures are likely to vary across the three stages.  
For instance, if other firms are rapidly adopting outsourcing, then the focal firm might face greater 
pressures to outsource.  Accordingly, the differences across the three stages have implications 
for outsourcing governance.  However, previous IS literature has largely neglected the role of 
institutional stages and varying pressures across these stages in influencing outsourcing 
decisions.  Accordingly, against this backdrop, we aim to answer the following research question: 
At various stages of institutionalization, what is the relative impact of institutional 
pressures and transaction cost factors on outsourcing governance structures? 
This research offers two key contributions.  First, the outsourcing literature has examined both the 
determinants (e.g., strategic intent for IT outsourcing) and the consequences of outsourcing (e.g., 
benefits of IT outsourcing) [Dhar and Balakrishnan 2006; DiRomualdo and Gurbaxani 1998; 
Lacity and Willcocks 1998, 2001; Lee and Kim 1999; Levina and Ross 2003; Willcocks et al. 
1996, 1999; Willcocks and Kern 1998].  However, limited research has addressed the institutional 
pressures faced by the firm and their implications for outsourcing.  In linking institutional 
pressures to TCT explanations, we hope to add to the current understanding on the antecedents 
of IS outsourcing governance.  As noted earlier, empirical and anecdotal evidence points to 
instances where TCT alone has failed to account for IT outsourcing behavior.  By incorporating 
institutional theory in IT outsourcing research, gaps in TCT rationalization to outsourcing 
governance could be explained.  For example, a community bank’s decision to outsource its new 
Internet banking function to Digital Insight might be more based on normative pressures 
emanating from ABA endorsement rather than rational, efficiency-based explanations (e.g., risk) 
advanced by TCT.  Hence, when institutional pressures prevail, managers need to assess their 
strength and manage them prudently in making decisions based on either TCT or institutional 
theory prescriptions to IT outsourcing.  
Second, limited research has addressed the three stages of institutionalization and their 
implications for outsourcing.  By linking institutional stages to transaction cost explanations, we 
hope to understand the circumstances in which one theoretical interpretation dominates the other.  
In other words, based on the stage of institutionalization of a particular IT outsourcing practice 
and the degree of institutional pressures, one theoretical perspective could better explain IT 
outsourcing governance than the other.  For example, as an industry’s initial pace of adoption in 
customer relationship management (CRM) applications increases, firms in this industry are likely 
to adopt outsourcing of such systems due to increasing mimetic pressures and hence exert less 
effort in screening.  Lacity and Willcocks [2001] observe that the South Australia (SA) 
government’s $AU 600 million contract with EDS in 1995 gained attention of both the federal 
                                                                                                                                                             
vary from emergence of the application service providers (ASP) model to component-based 
development.  Although Tuchman and Anderson are not considered institutional theorists, the 
concept of technology change typifies coercive pressures relevant to the outsourcing context 
discussed in our research.  Nonetheless, other scholars have acknowledged the impact of 
technology change on institutions.  For instance, Tolbert and Zucker [1999] point out that 
innovation resulting from technological change causes breakdown of habitualized institutional 
behaviors.  
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government and the media.  As outsourcing practices in majority of governmental entities become 
institutionalized (stability stage), other governments across the globe will turn to vendors such as 
EDS (less screening) and adopt standard industry sanctioned outsourcing practices (e.g., 
monitoring).  Finally, during the deinstitutionalization phase as old technologies become obsolete 
and new technologies emerge, it is likely that firms will engage in more screening and monitoring 
(due to uncertainty).  Therefore, managers need to focus not only on the strength of institutional 
pressures, but also on stage of institutionalization in determining whether to apply TCT or 
institutional theory recommendations to IT outsourcing. 
In a recent study, Miranda and Kim [2006] focused on professional and political contexts in city 
governments in the U.S. and examined how institutional factors mitigate otherwise transaction 
cost heuristics applied to outsourcing decisions.  Several key differences between their work and 
our research can be identified.  First, we consider three phases of institutionalization and how 
institutional factors in each phase affect outsourcing decisions while aforementioned authors do 
not make such a distinction.  Second, they consider “a less widespread variant of institutional 
theory; the institutionalizing effects of norms and beliefs subscribed to within organizations” 
[Miranda and Kim 2006, p. 276], rather than the traditional view where institutional forces 
emanate from the firm’s external environment.  For instance, they classify mayor-council city 
government style to be professional context and council-manager city government style to be 
political context.  In contrast, we consider institutional forces originating from both within as well 
as outside the firm such as from professional organizations or because of external regulatory 
changes, technology discontinuities, etc.  Third, we take a more micro-view of outsourcing 
decisions by taking into consideration firm’s ex-ante screening and ex-post monitoring of the 
vendor.  As we will highlight later in the paper, although a firm might first consider outsourcing for 
cost reasons, after screening, it may decide against outsourcing fearing vendor opportunism; 
hence, a closer examination of governance in terms of screen and monitoring is warranted.  
Nonetheless, it should be noted that Miranda and Kim’s work have considerably enhanced our 
understanding of how institutional forces affect outsourcing decisions. 
Our paper is organized as follows.  First, we provide an overview of our conceptual framework, 
wherein we present evidence as to how transaction cost factors and institutional pressures 
separately influence outsourcing governance.  Then, we link transaction cost and institutional 
explanations to outsourcing governance at various stages of institutionalization.  Finally, we end 
with a discussion about future research directions and managerial implications. 
II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
In order to answer our research question, we focus on the theoretical model in Figure 1.  First, we 
highlight how transaction cost factors influence firm’s decision to outsource and corresponding 
screening and monitoring of the vendor.  Second, we highlight how institutional pressures impact 
governance structures.  Later, in considering the stages of institutionalization, we overlay the 
influence of the institutional environment on the firm-vendor relationship and reexamine the 
conditions under which TCT explanations continue to be dominant or give way to institutional 
explanations of the outsourcing phenomenon.  We consider asset specificity9 as a moderating 
variable that effects outsourcing governance.   
 
                                                     
9 Asset specificity refers to the degree to which an asset can be redeployed to alternative uses 
and by alternative users [Williamson and Winter 1993].  While other factors such as uncertainty 
and frequency could function as moderators, we chose to include only asset specificity because it 
is found to be the most relevant predictor of governance in TCT [Geyskens et al. 2006]. 
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 Figure 1.   A Model for IS Outsourcing Governance 
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TRANSACTION COST PERSPECTIVE 
TCT focuses on relationships between organizations that are assumed to be rational in their 
decision making and engage in efficiency-based transactions [Roberts and Greenwood 1997; 
Williamson 1981].  Accordingly, in an inter-organizational outsourcing relationship, transaction 
cost factors such as bounded rationality, opportunism and risk are argued to influence 
governance structures (i.e., adoption decision, screening, and monitoring) [Chiles and McMackin 
1996; Williamson 1985].  Bounded rationality emerges because of inherent cognitive limitations of 
humans.  As Simon [1961, p. xxiv] contends, “human behavior is intendedly rational, but only 
limitedly so.”  These constraints limit a firm’s ability to make an optimal decision on whether to 
outsource or insource, and in case of outsourcing, find the most suitable vendor and then write 
comprehensive, all-encompassing contracts that account for every possible contingency [Kishore 
et al. 2003; Lee et al. 2003].   
Based on both relationship-specific and environmental characteristics, the vendor could take 
advantage of the firm by acting opportunistically.  Opportunism is defined as “self-interest seeking 
with guile” [Williamson 1985, p. 47].  For instance, a vendor can behave opportunistically in cases 
where it has monopolistic power or when there is information asymmetry in its favor [Willcocks et 
al. 1999; Williamson 1975]. 
Finally, the firm faces certain risks inherent in outsourcing relationships.  Contractual risks such 
as vendor bankruptcy, vendor’s inability to deliver, contract breach by the vendor and 
uncontrollable contract growth, among others are often identified as perils of outsourcing [Aubert 
et al. 2002; Jurison 2002; Klepper and Jones 1998; Lacity and Hirschheim 1993; Whang 1992]. 
To mitigate the effects of these transaction cost factors, the firm engages in elaborate 
mechanisms in screening the vendor ex-ante and monitoring the vendor ex-post [Bergen et al. 
1992; Grover et al. 1998; Jacobides and Croson 2001].  In screening, the firm’s goal is to identify 
a potential vendor who is best suited for providing a certain IS service [Bergen et al. 1992].  
Because of the number and variety of vendors and the nature of the signals they emit, screening 
plays a crucial role in identifying the “right” vendor.  Accordingly, the challenge for the firm is to 
ascertain the relationship between signals and future performance [Spence 1974].  Given the 
information asymmetry in favor of vendors prior to entering into outsourcing arrangements with 
firms [Bergen et al. 1992; Spence 1974], screening helps firms to identify private information 
about the vendors.  More importantly, through screening, firms can reduce the risk of opportunism 
and adverse selection [Mishra et al. 1998; Wathne and Heide 2000].  Screening methods vary 
from simple interviews, surveys of a vendor’s existing customers to complex requests for 
proposals (RFP).10 
In monitoring the vendor, firms may use their own employees to obtain qualitative assessments of 
the vendor’s performance or require key vendor personnel to interact with firm personnel on a 
regular basis.  Furthermore, firm personnel may examine intermediate documents such as design 
specifications or test reports that result during the outsourcing process.  Alternatively, firms could 
employ control systems by examining financial records, requiring regular updates on certain 
financial criteria, or requesting responses to irregularities in audits [Hitt et al., 1990].  By 
monitoring, the firm aims to ensure that the vendor fulfills its obligations and guard against 
potential vendor opportunism. 
The firm’s decision to outsource, and corresponding screening and monitoring efforts are 
intertwined (hence the arrows between them in Figure 1).  A firm might consider outsourcing 
because of skyrocketing costs of insourcing.  Based on this decision, the firm might engage in an 
                                                     
10 Request for Proposal (RFP) document typically details minimum requirements of the 
outsourcing project to prospective service providers and request that they submit bids [Klepper 
and Jones 1998].   
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elaborate scheme to screen suitable vendors.  However, as a result of this screening exercise, 
the firm may decide against outsourcing because of significant potential for vendor opportunism.  
Therefore, in this particular case, the firm would decide after all to keep insourcing its IS 
operations, at least until prevailing conditions change.  
Rational, efficiency-based TCT approach to assessing governance costs (e.g., screening and 
monitoring) and the corresponding outsourcing decision can be explained using Figure 2.  For a 
given asset specificity K, I(K) and O(K) illustrate the cost curves for insourcing and outsourcing, 
respectively.  At a particular asset specificity point Ki, the firm is indifferent to either insourcing or 
outsourcing.  However, at point Ki+x, the rational firm realizes that given its risk preferences with 
respect to outsourcing of specific assets, insourcing would lower governance costs.  In contrast, 
at point Ki-x (i.e., lower asset specificity), the firm would lower governance cost by outsourcing.  
INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
When considered in isolation, TCT’s limitations in explaining contractual relationships have been 
acknowledged.  For instance, in their meta-analysis of extant empirical studies, David and Han 
[2004] found only mixed support for TCT explanations for contract governance.  One possible 
reason for these ambiguous findings might be that as Granovetter [1985] contents, TCT 
represents an under-socialized account of organizational behavior.  By observing that TCT takes 
a purely economic approach to studying organizations that focuses primarily on rational decision 
making and efficient transactions, Williamson [1981] further supports this assertion.  However, 
more recently, scholars [e.g., Granovetter 1985; Grewal and Dharwadkar 2002; Teo et al. 2003; 
Uzzi 1996] have emphasized the importance of the institutional setting in explaining inter-
organizational relationships.  Hence, we now place the IS outsourcing in the larger institutional 
context, and highlight how differing institutional pressures foster or constrain governance 
















We begin by delineating the key contextual variable in institutional theory, namely, the 





Figure 2. Outsourcing Cost Curves [Chiles and McMackin 1996] 
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organizations that constitute a recognized area of institutional life, including key suppliers, 
consumers, regulatory agencies, and competitors.  We believe that it is important to locate the 
outsourcing contracts within the organizational field in order to incorporate the institutional 
influences in a meaningful manner.  For the rest of this paper, we use the term organizational 
field to refer to the set of organizations that form meaningful reference points for any activity 
within the focal firm (i.e., the firm of interest to us).  For example, the banking industry could be 
considered as an organizational field and one could easily study the prevalence of institutional 
practices within this field [Ang and Cummings 1997].  On the other hand, one could also construe 
the organizational field more broadly and consider the firms that are part of the S&P 500 index to 
be an organizational field and easily study the dispersion of institutional practices within this set of 
firms.  Thus, a relevant organization field has to be defined and clearly identified in carrying out 
empirical work in this domain. 
In addition to the concept of the organizational field, most institutional theorists have arrived at a 
consensus on the various sources of institutional pressures within an organizational field.  We 
have briefly alluded to them in the introduction (namely, mimetic, normative, and coercive) and 
now develop them in greater detail.  In order to develop the sources of mimetic pressure, we rely 
on two concepts: “connectedness” and “structural equivalence” with respect to organizational 
fields [Davis 1991; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Teo et al. 2003].  Specifically, we consider 
connectedness in terms of direct interactions between field constituents (such as board 
interlocks).  In the context of outsourcing, any firm that interacts with an outsourcing firm due to a 
board interlock is being exposed to outsourcing by the first hand experience of the focal firm’s 
executive on the board of the outsourcing firm.  In addition to such direct exposures (through 
interaction), one may also consider indirect sources of institutional pressures from structurally 
equivalent organizations that may have no direct ties but have similar relational patterns within 
fields.  In other words, a focal firm may be pressured to adopt outsourcing if other structurally 
equivalent firms that share similar ties to suppliers, regulators, consumers, and so forth begin to 
outsource.   
In addition to mimetic pressures, institutional theorists also focus on pressures to conform that 
originate outside of connectedness or structural equivalence, and form the basis for normative 
acceptance of practices due to professionalization, education, and trade associations [Ouchi 
1980; Teo et al. 2003; Useem 1979].  In the context of outsourcing, if a focal firm is part of a trade 
association that actively promotes outsourcing, then the focal firm will be more inclined to employ 
those outsourcing vendors adopted by members of the association.  While some normative 
pressures are easily identifiable (promotion by a professional association), others form the bases 
of cognitive processes that may be taken for granted at the habitual level, reflecting the extreme 
form of normative pressures that become ingrained and codified in societal structures.  This may 
happen through the education system that creates a class of individuals who think alike and can 
be easily interchanged, and given their common training come to accept outsourcing practices on 
a habitual basis [DiMaggio and Powell 1983].  Many Japanese automakers routinely outsource a 
large portion of the final product for habitual reasons, while many U.S. automakers, whose 
employees have not been raised in the outsourcing paradigm, continue to make a larger portion 
of the final product in-house [Grewal and Dharwadkar 2002].     
Literature provides evidence to support the assertion that mimetic and normative institutional 
pressures lower governance costs [e.g., Cyert and March 1963; Teo et al. 2003].  When a firm 
realizes that most of its competitors outsource, it tends to adopt similar outsourcing practices in 
order to achieve legitimacy among its customers and business partners [DiMaggio and Powell 
1983[.  In doing so, the focal firm is less likely to engage in comprehensive screening and 
monitoring, and instead use the same vendors (less screening) and adopt standard, industry-
sanctioned monitoring practices employed by its competitors or other firms belonging to the same 
professional organization [Cyert and March 1963; Teo et al. 2003].  For example, when a retailer 
decides to outsource its applications to GERS Retail Systems because of National Retail 
Federation’s endorsement, it is not expected to engage in elaborate screening (ex-ante) or 
monitoring (ex-post).  Because conforming to institutional pressures are said to make 
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organizations homogeneous [DiMaggio and Powell 1983], these organizations are therefore 
expected to adopt similar outsourcing practices.  
The reason why a firm that would not find outsourcing attractive from a TCT perspective, but 
would find it appealing from an institutional perspective can be explained using Figure 3.  Besides 
the O(K) and I(K) cost curves already discussed earlier in Figure 2, we introduce OI(K) to 
represent the cost curve for outsourcing in an environment with strong institutional pressures.  
The curve OI(K) emerges to the right of O(K) because of lower outsourcing governance costs 
(e.g., screening) when strong mimetic and normative pressures prevail.  Hence, in a weaker 
institutional setting, the firm compares O(K) and I(K) cost curves at asset specificity point Kj to 
decide that insourcing makes the most economic sense.  Conversely, in a stronger institutional 
setting, the firm compares OI(K) and I(K) cost curves to decide that outsourcing makes the less 
costly alternative.  C and CI represent the corresponding governance costs in the insourcing and 
outsourcing scenarios, respectively.     
 
We now turn our attention to the final institutional pressure, namely coercive.  In extant 
institutional theory, coercive pressures mainly originate in governmental fiats and regulations or 
through the mechanism of inducement in the form of governmental subsidy [Grewal and 
Dharwadkar 2002; Tolbert and Zucker 1983].  What is of more interest in the outsourcing context 
is the influence of coercive pressure arising from technological changes that may initiate the 
beginning of new outsourcing cycles [Tushman and Anderson 1986].  For example, consider the 
component-based development (CBD) paradigm.  A firm that is considering outsourcing its 
application development function might decide against adopting traditional solutions because of 
coercive pressures placed on it.  Instead, it might decide to adopt a CBD approach to developing 
applications where the components are fabricated by outside vendors while the application 
assembly may be carried out by the firm in-house.  In fact, the emergence of vendors such as 
iCMG that specialize in providing component development services leads to such technological 
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technologies emerge as a result of coercive institutional pressures, it is likely that firms will 
engage in more screening and monitoring (e.g., due to uncertainty). 
STAGES OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION: LINKING TRANSACTION COSTS WITH 
INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURES 
In addition to the pressures noted earlier, institutional theorists also concur that the process of 
institutionalization follows a path in which there is (1) an early phase of acceptance of an 
innovation followed by diffusion; (2) a middle phase of complete acceptance and stability; (3) and 
a final stage involving de-legitimizing [Lawrence et al. 2001; Tolbert and Zucker 1996; Zucker 
1977].11  However, previous IS literature has largely neglected the role of institutional stages and 
varying pressures across these stages in influencing outsourcing decisions.  Recent work by 
Lawrence and colleagues [Lawrence et al. 2001] describes the three stages of a typical 
institutional process using an “S”-shaped curve.  The first stage is the “innovation diffusion” stage 
where innovations are adopted and eventually diffused within a field.  Although the duration of 
this stage may vary, it is defined as “the length of time taken for an innovation to become diffused 
throughout an organizational field” [Lawrence et al.,2001, p. 627].  This represents a line from the 
origin of a Cartesian system in which no organization has adopted the innovation to the “top” of 
the S, where the percentage of organizations that has adopted the innovation is at its maximum.  
A steeper curve suggests a more rapid rate of diffusion.  The second stage is described as the 
“stability” stage and is “the length of time over which the institution remains highly diffused and 
legitimated” [Lawrence et al. 2001, p. 628]. This refers to the top part of the S curve and the 
persistence of the innovation until the third stage, when “de-legitimization” could occur (where the 
top of the S falls).   
The three institutional pressures, mimetic, normative, and coercive correspond with the three 
institutional stages, innovation diffusion, stability, and de-legitimization, respectively.  At the early 
phase of the institutionalization cycle (i.e., innovation diffusion), organizations mimic each other to 
reduce uncertainties associated with emerging outsourcing technologies and practices [Scott 
1987].  To address their common problems during the diffusion stage, organizations embrace 
solutions adopted by their peers [DiMaggio and Powell 1983].  Professional associations and 
educational systems representing the normative base for diffusion take time to materialize and 
therefore would only emerge after a particular outsourcing practice has archived stability in the 
organizational field.  The beginning of the stability stage marks the point when the “impetus for 
diffusion shifts from simple imitation to a more normative base” [Tolbert and Zucker 1999, p. 177].  
Finally, coercive pressures emanating from technological change help bring down previously 
institutionalized outsourcing practices during the deinstitutionalization stage.  Brandes et al. 
[2005] provides further support for this correspondence between institutional pressures and 
institutional stages. 
Although the contribution of institutional theory in explaining inter-organizational relationships 
such as outsourcing in a strong institutional context is widely applauded, when considered in 
isolation, it has limitations that fail to account for governance structures in certain situations [e.g., 
Roberts and Greenwood 1997].12  In general, institutional theory is argued to represent an over-
                                                     
11 As mentioned earlier, the institutional cycle as described here is most meaningful in the context 
of outsourcing of a particular IS service (e.g., Web-hosting, application development, etc.).   
12 At this point, we wish to distinguish our work with that of Roberts and Greenwood [1997].  First 
of all, although R&G refer to mimetic isomorphism and normative pillars, they do not address how 
adopted organizational designs fall out of favor due to coercive pressures.  Secondly, Roberts 
and Greenwood [1997] do not discuss the stages of institutionalization and how different 
institutional pressures (mimetic, normative, and coercive) impact governance structures 
(outsourcing adoption decision, screening, and monitoring) during various stages.  Finally, in their 
discussion of various organizational designs, R&G include “hierarchies, franchises, 
multidivisionals, conglomerates, holding companies, clans, networks, and market-hierarchy 
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socialized view on inter-organizational relationships [Granovetter 1985].  More specifically, 
institutional theorists fail to envisage how governance structures emerge in the case of weak or 
non-existent institutional settings.  Toward this end, in the next section, we present evidence as to 
how rational, efficiency-based transaction cost perspective and non-choice based institutional 
perspective could be interlaced at various stages of the institutional process to better explain 
outsourcing governance.   
Innovation Diffusion Stage  
According to Tolbert and Zucker [1996], the innovation diffusion stage begins when organizations 
are subject to external pressures due to legislation, technological change, or market forces (see 
the dashed segment in Figure 4).  Furthermore, they also suggest that interorganization 
mimicking leads to eventual acceptance of the practices of interest (in our case, outsourcing).  At 
the beginning of this stage, the number of adopters are “likely to be comparatively few in number, 
limited to a circumscribed set of similar, possibly interconnected organizations facing similar 
circumstances” [Tolbert and Zucker 1999].  The initial interorganization mimicking is facilitated 
through direct connectedness between the organizations [DiMaggio and Powell 1983].  Yet, at 
this early stage, a vast number of firms in the organizational field continue to assess governance 
structures based on transaction cost factors.  However, as the stage progresses, the sources of 
institutional pressures can change from those emanating from direct ties (e.g., board-interlocks) 
to those stemming from indirect pressures due to structural equivalence [DiMaggio and Powell 
1983].  In other words, in this stage, the nature and extent of mimetic pressure will vary within any 
organizational field.    
We now highlight how increasing mimetic pressures emanating from network ties or structural 
equivalence could persuade firms that may not consider outsourcing attractive from a TCT 
perspective to adopt outsourcing arrangements.  In the front-end of this stage, if the focal firm is 
exposed to a large number of firms adopting outsourcing through board interlocks, then the focal 
firm is more likely to mimic outsourcing practices of interconnected organizations [Haveman 
1993].  Herein, we define the concept mimetic connected density as a count of firms that had 
adopted IS outsourcing and linked to the focal firm through board interlocks.  Similarly, in the later 
part of this stage, the indirect ties come to the forefront in that as a larger number of firms that are 
similar to the focal firm or as a larger number of successful firms begin to adopt the outsourcing 
practices, they tend to acquire increased legitimacy, and consequently, the focal firm may feel the 
need to conform to the institutional pressures and adopt outsourcing.  Thus, these two important 
institutional forces can be captured through mimetic market density (size and success), in that, if 
the number of similar firms adopt IS outsourcing (termed as size localized market density) or if 
the number of successful firms increasingly adopt IS outsourcing (termed as successful firm 
market density), then the focal firm is more likely to adopt institutionalized outsourcing 
[Haveman,1993].   
More specifically, we argue that in the presence of strong mimetic pressures, the firm’s decision 
to adopt outsourcing and corresponding screening and monitoring efforts will be influenced by 
institutional forces rather than by transaction cost factors.  For example, as mimetic density of a 
field increases, a focal firm may begin to adopt governance structures based on those adopted by 
its interlocked peers or its comparison peers instead of those based on classic transaction cost 
factors, namely, bounded rationality, opportunism and risk.  As this happens, characteristics of 
governance structures may converge to institutional averages in a way that de-links them from 
these transaction cost factors.  To use some specific numbers, consider two density scenarios: 
                                                                                                                                                             
hybrids” (p. 347).  We however focus on the decision to outsource together with levels of 
screening and monitoring.  Moreover, R&G takes a micro-view on the organizations and their 
relationships in examining “organizational design adoption.”  Our research on the other hand 
takes a more macro-view of the organization in examining their relationships with each other with 
respect to outsourcing. 
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15 percent versus 80 percent.  When only 15 percent of the firms have adopted the practice, the 
focal firm is not intensely pressured to mimic others.  Hence, in the absence of strong institutional 
mimetic pressures, the firm is likely to employ TCT prescriptions for IT outsourcing governance.  
In other words, in this scenario, the firm’s outsourcing decisions will likely be influenced by 
bounded rationality, opportunism, and risk.  On the other hand, if 80 percent of the firms have 
adopted an IT outsourcing practice, then the focal firm faces greater mimetic pressures to follow 
suit; as a result, it is likely to emulate other firms in adopting the IT outsourcing practice (i.e., 
conformance to institutional theory).  Hence, we propose:   
Proposition 1a:  The greater the density of the organizational field during innovation 
diffusion, the greater the possibility of transaction cost factors being replaced by mimetic 
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Figure 4. Institutional and Transaction Cost Explanation of IS Outsourcing Governance (based on 
Lawrence et al. [2001]) 
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In addition to considering the cross-sectional density factors (i.e., from both direct and indirect 
ties), it also behooves researchers to capture the dynamic nature of the process in this stage.  As 
mentioned earlier, dynamism at this stage refers to “pace” with which innovations get diffused 
within an organizational field.  For example, in Figure 4 (dashed segment), one can clearly see 
three different rates of diffusion, ranging from low to high.  When the diffusion rates are low, the 
institutional logics do not gain rapid acceptance within an organizational field.  On the other hand, 
if diffusion rates are high, then institutional logics will begin to dominate within organizational 
fields.   
We argue that this rate of diffusion will have implications with respect to the abilities of the firms to 
use transaction cost based governance structures.  For instance, if the diffusion rate is low, then 
the focal firm will be able to adopt outsourcing arrangements that are suitable for its 
organizational context.  If only a small number of connected or equivalent firms adopt outsourcing 
over an extended period during this stage, the firms will be in a position to make rational, 
efficiency-based choices (e.g., screening) rooted in transaction cost factors (e.g., bounded 
rationality).  However, if diffusion occurs rapidly, such that the entire organizational field adopts 
outsourcing in a very short time period, then institutionalization will set in more rapidly, de-linking 
transaction cost factors from outsourcing contracts.  For example, as the pace in which 
outsourcing is diffused increases, a focal firm may begin to adopt governance structures based 
on those employed by its interlocked peers or its comparison peers instead of those based on 
transaction cost factors (e.g., opportunism).  Hence, we suggest that if we consider the pace at 
which firms in a particular organizational field adopt IS outsourcing, we will be in a better position 
to understand as to when outsourcing governance structures turn from TCT explanations.  
Accordingly, we propose that:  
Proposition 1b: The greater the pace of adoption of the organizational field during 
innovation diffusion, the greater the possibility of transaction cost factors being replaced 
by mimetic institutional factors in explaining outsourcing governance structures.    
Stability Stage 
According to institutional theorists, the stability stage begins when the rate of outsourcing 
adoptions reaches a plateau within a particular organizational field, and members use 
outsourcing widely and unquestionably (see the solid segment in Figure 4) [Lawrence et al. 
2001].  However, normative pressures vary across organizational fields and over time.  Higher 
normative pressures can result from professional association membership (i.e., industry-specific 
associations), as well as from the use of professional services (i.e., outsourcing consultants).  
Firms’ ability to influence the normative basis of outsourcing arrangements will impact structural 
aspects of outsourcing.  As this stage unfolds, professional outsourcing consultants, as graduates 
of education and certification systems, serve as champions of outsourcing innovations [Pfeffer 
and Cohen 1984]. 
As we discussed in the previous stage, two aspects of stability will also be important in 
determining the influence of normative institutional processes in this stage.  First, the level at 
which the outsourcing arrangements become stable in the organizational field will have crucial 
implications for the acceptance of the outsourcing practices.  If only 20 percent of the relevant 
field has adopted outsourcing and consequently the normative acceptance of the practice is low, 
then professional associations and professionalization are unlikely to unleash institutional 
pressures that the focal organization cannot withstand.  In such instances, the focal organization 
will be able to pursue efficiency-based rational governance structures rooted in transaction cost 
factors.  On the other hand, if there is a high degree of normative legitimacy, then professional 
association and educational systems will pressure the focal organization to adopt normatively 
accepted structures that have societally sanctioned legitimacy.  Until some external pressure de-
legitimates such structures, organizations may be forced to comply with contracts that are based 
on institutional norms instead of efficiency-based rational ones promoted by TCT.  Consider the 
National Grocers Association (NGA), the primary professional association for grocery stores in 
the US.  In its Web site, NGA promotes IS service providers such as Concord to its members 
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[nationalgrocers.org].  Consequently, when a majority of its peers have outsourced their key tasks 
to Concord, a particular NGA member will tend to outsource relevant grocery services (e.g., 
inventory management, customer profiling, etc.) to Concord (e.g., less screening) and not engage 
in excessive monitoring once contracts are signed.13  On the other hand, consider the variety of 
educational systems and training programs offered by Microsoft.  The Microsoft Certified 
Application Developer (MCAD) certification is argued to provide industry recognition for 
professional developers who build applications using Microsoft Visual Studio® .NET and XML 
Web services [microsoft.com].  Hence, when the firm realizes that a vendor has relevant industry-
accepted certification in application development, it is not likely to excessively screen or monitor 
the vendor.  Hence, we posit that: 
Proposition 2a: The greater the density of the organizational field during the stability 
stage, the greater the possibility of transaction cost factors being replaced by normative 
institutional factors in explaining outsourcing governance structures.     
Once again, in addition to considering the level at which stability arises, it is important to consider 
the dynamic aspects of stability, especially, the time elapsed since outsourcing arrangements 
were considered stable within an organizational field.  Paralleling our arguments with respect to 
rate in the innovation diffusion stage, we can contemplate time horizons with respect to stability.  
Some fields could have very low stability periods due to the inherently unstable nature of 
contracting arrangements while in other fields, contracting arrangements may continue on for a 
long time at a particular level.  This dynamic aspect of stability will matter with respect to the 
power of the institutional logic within a given organizational field.  When stability periods are short, 
institutional logics will not prevail as easily.  In such circumstances, firms will consider 
governance structures (e.g., monitoring) according to rational, efficiency-based contracts 
advocated by TCT.  On the other hand, if stability periods are long, then institutional logics will 
have dominant effects in determining structural aspects of outsourcing arrangements within the 
organizational field.     
Based on the previous information, we would contend that when stability stage is shorter, the firm 
has greater opportunities to choose more rational, efficiency-based outsourcing arrangements.  
For example, assume the case in which 75 percent of the firms have adopted outsourcing during 
the stability stage.  Now consider two stability scenarios: a) three months and b) five years.  If the 
stability period has lasted only three months and the outsourcing has not caught on, then the 
impact of normative institutional pressures is rather weak.  Normative pressures emanating from 
professional associations and education systems take time to cultivate.  In such instances, the 
focal organization has greater latitude in designing outsourcing governance structures in 
accordance with TCT prescriptions based on bounded rationality, opportunism, and risk.  On the 
other hand, if the stability period has lasted for more than five years, then the focal firm is greatly 
constrained by the institutional environment.  In other words, as the institutional logics harden and 
get reinforced, the focal organization will be limited in its choices with respect to the outsourcing 
arrangements.  Therefore, we propose that:     
Proposition 2b: The greater the stability of the organizational field during the stability 
stage, the greater the possibility of transaction cost factors being replaced by normative 
institutional factors in explaining outsourcing governance structures.     
                                                     
13 The concept of “network externalities” might come in to play here.  Network externality refers to 
the situation when the utility that a particular firm obtains from a good or service depends upon 
the number of other firms who are in the same network.  For example, a grocer belonging to NGA 
indirectly benefits from the fact that Concord is not likely to be opportunistic when serving NGA-
member grocers; hence, this particular grocer would not engage in excessive screening in 
selecting Concord ex-ante and monitoring of the vendor ex-post.  Nonetheless, we believe that 
institutional perspective sufficiently captures both direct and indirect pressures on the focal firm. 
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 DE-INSTITUTIONALIZATION STAGE 
The final stage in the institutional process begins when the level of stability begins to drop due to 
coercive pressures.  It is entirely possible that in some instances, structural arrangements in the 
field may be taken for granted in a particular organizational field to such an extent that they are 
reified and take on a life of their own due to cognitive acceptance by the field constituents.  
However, in most cases, structural arrangements can get de-institutionalized.  This can happen 
rapidly due to coercive pressures from regulatory changes, media backlash, or technological 
changes (see the dotted segment in Figure 4).  During the period leading up to 2004 U.S. 
presidential election, there was media backlash about the loss of jobs due to outsourcing by 
American firms.  Some have advocated tax incentives for firms that do not outsource work 
overseas. 
Nonetheless, in a market economy, innovative technological changes could easily trigger 
deinstitutionalization and mark the beginning of a new outsourcing cycle.  For example, as more 
firms began to use application service providers (ASPs) since the mid-90s, fewer firms had the 
need to develop their own applications.  Hence, instead of outsourcing application development 
outright, these firms utilize services offered by ASPs.  Sedona Corp.’s Web-based Intarsia system 
houses its clients’ CRM applications and provides the bandwidth, security and service [ABA 
Banking Journal 2000].  In this particular case, the emergence of the ASP paradigm represents 
coercive pressures of the technological change causing deinstitutionalization of prevailing 
outsourcing governance structures.  Before ASP model surfaced, firms had only two choices, 
either insource or outsource the application development process. 
Once again, we consider the implications of both the density and the rate of deinstitutionalization 
for outsourcing from the perspective of the focal organization.  If the deinstitutionalization from 
coercive pressures occurs to an extent that a large majority of the previous adoptees in an 
organizational field abandon outsourcing, then the focal firm that is considering outsourcing may 
be able to deflect existing normative institutional pressures and design governance structures 
based on transaction cost factors.  Envisage the case where the focal firm is debating whether to 
outsource its payroll function during the deinstitutionalization stage when a large number of 
current adoptees have already switched to the purchase of configurable commercial-off-the-shelf 
(COTS) software (i.e., low density scenario).  In such a case, the focal firm will resort to TCT 
factors such as risk and opportunism to decide whether to go ahead with outsourcing of payroll 
systems.14  Because the normative pressure emanating from a fewer set of adoptees is 
considerably lower, firms have the freedom to carefully examine outsourcing governance 
structures (decision to adopt outsourcing, screening for a suitable vendor and monitoring the 
vendor) from a TCT perspective.  
On the other hand, if the density or the level of acceptance is still high, then existing normative 
institutional pressures might pervade for a longer time before caving in the face of TCT 
prescriptions.  In contrasting the above example with the case when only a few of the current 
adoptees have switched to COTS (i.e., high density scenario), because of prevailing normative 
institutional pressures, there is a greater likelihood that the focal firm will adopt outsourcing as 
there are still a large number of current adoptees, or screen potential vendors or monitor selected 
vendors based on normative institutional prescriptions.  
As information technologies change from object-oriented development to ASP service model to 
mobile commerce, coercive institutional pressures impact IS outsourcing governance structures.  
We suggest that as the deinstitutionalization process unfolds, one is likely to see the emergence 
of transaction cost-based explanations as rational, efficiency-based analysis will begin to 
dominate the institutional pressures.   Hence, we propose that: 
                                                     
14 In this case, the emergence of COTS itself typifies coercive forces that trigger technology 
change.  Before COTS emerged, the focal firm had only two options for securing payroll software, 
either insource or outsource. 
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Proposition 3a: The lower the density of the organizational field during 
deinstitutionalization, the greater the possibility of normative institutional factors being 
replaced by transaction cost factors in explaining outsourcing governance structures. 
Finally, we turn our attention to the rate of deinstitutionalization.  Our earlier arguments relating to 
the level of institutionalization suggest that deinstitutionalization occurring from lower levels will 
result in the quicker re-emergence of transaction cost explanations to governance characteristics 
in contrast to the one occurring from higher levels within the field.  However, it is not just the level 
that is important, but also the rate at which deinstitutionalization unfolds.  If outsourcing practices 
get delegitimated rapidly, then the pressure on the focal firm to reconsider outsourcing from the 
institutional perspective will be great.  For example, consider the case of 50 percent density at the 
time the focal firm is debating whether to outsource its payroll function when others have started 
to purchase COTS.  Now consider two rate scenarios where 8 (low rate) and 75 (high rate) firms 
in the organizational field abandon outsourcing within the last month.  In the first scenario when 
only a smaller fraction of firms abandoned outsourcing during the past month, the institutional 
influences on the focal firm is still greater as more firms (vis-à-vis second scenario) are expected 
to remain committed to outsourcing in the future, at least in the short term.  However, when a 
higher number of firms have abandoned outsourcing over the last month as in the case of the 
second scenario, the institutional influence on the focal firm is much less as fewer firms are 
expected to remain committed to outsourcing in the immediate future.  When normative 
institutional pressures diminish much faster when deinstitutionalization rate is high, firms will 
revert back to more rational, efficiency-based TCT outsourcing governance structures.  If the 
focal firm is already outsourcing, then deinstitutionalization will effect its monitoring at a higher 
rate.  In this scenario, the focal firm is more likely to revert to transaction cost factors (bounded 
rationality, opportunism, and risk) to structure outsourcing contracts as normative pressures to 
adopt institutional contracts subsides.  Hence, we propose: 
Proposition 3b: The greater the rate of deinstitutionalization of the organizational field, 
greater the possibility of normative institutional factors being replaced by transaction cost 
factors in explaining outsourcing governance structures.  
III. DISCUSSION 
In this article, we augment the rational, efficiency-based perspectives on outsourcing with the 
non-choice based sociological perspective in order to describe outsourcing in the IS context.  
Although we used TCT because of its wider application in the outsourcing domain, one could 
certainly employ any of the other rational, efficiency-based theories such as resource-based or 
agency to complement institutional settings that force organizations to conform to institutionalized 
norms, beliefs and taken-for-granted practices.  In adopting the institutional theory, we are 
heeding the call of scholars like Orlikowski and Barley [2001], Teo et al., [2003], and Miranda and 
Kim [2006] who have highlighted the need to account for the institutional context in research on 
information technology and organizations.   
We seek to extend research in IS outsourcing by incorporating the institutional context in terms of 
the implications of mimetic, normative, and coercive forces as well as by incorporating the 
temporal dynamics of the institutionalization process by considering pace, stability, and 
deinstitutionalization of IS outsourcing practices.  We began by identifying the implications of 
transaction cost factors on outsourcing governance structures.  We then argued that as IS 
practices diffuse in organizational fields, institutional explanations are able to expose intricacies of 
outsourcing governance structures.  Finally, to answer our research question, we theorized about 
the relative impact of transaction cost factors and institutional pressures on outsourcing 
governance structures during various stages of institutionalization. 
The impetus to integrate transaction cost theory and institutional theory arises from the limited 
empirical support for either theory in isolation [Ang and Cummings 1997; David and Han 2004; 
Oliver 1997b].  While transaction costs focus exclusively on rational approaches to decision-
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making, institutional theory relies singularly on non-choice behavior under all circumstances.  By 
taking such isolated positions, both theories fail to fit the real world phenomena that are driven by 
both sets of factors.  Consequently, one finds weak empirical support for the theories in applied 
setting.  That is, by merely seeking to isolate the transaction cost factors in understanding 
outsourcing governance and by completely ignoring the institutional bases of such structures, one 
would not find meaningful results especially in an institutionalized organizational field with respect 
to outsourcing.  Similarly, institutional empiricist will be hard pressed to find valid empirical results 
in highly innovative industries wherein the institutional processes are weak at best.  What we 
propose in this article is the isolation of the context, which enables us to understand the 
appropriate implications of the two theories in isolation as well as in combination.   
We also believe that it is necessary to point out some caveats regarding our theorizing.  First, 
certain organizations may have engaged in other types of outsourcing prior to IS outsourcing.  
For example, General Motors may be using outsourcing in the manufacturing process and 
consequently may feel very comfortable in dealing with vendors.  Similarly, a firm that has 
engaged in other types of outsourcing (e.g., telecommunications) is more likely to consider 
outsourcing application development in the future than a firm that has never engaged in any sort 
of IS outsourcing.  While we have not accounted for this contingency in our model, the 
institutional perspective is certainly well equipped to handle such situations.  Specifically, 
institutional theorists have developed a literature stream on habitualization where cognitive bases 
of phenomena override the economic bases.  That is, some firms may habitually outsource IS 
practices consistent with their outsourcing philosophy in other domains.     
Second, and perhaps a more important issue concerns the differentiation of contracts that may be 
determined based on the transaction cost and institutional perspectives.  We do not mean to say 
that the contract characteristics will be different for the two perspectives at all times.  From a 
rational perspective, imitation can be an uncertainty reduction mechanism and therefore firms 
may copy successful IS outsourcing practices, whereas institutional theory literature views such 
mimicking as a legitimacy gathering mechanism [Scott 1987].  Most institutional theorists do 
recognize that legitimacy frequently goes hand-in-hand with success [DiMaggio and Powell 
1983].  As the link between effort and performance becomes more ambiguous, it is often difficult 
to separate success mimicking from legitimacy mimicking [Scott 1995]. 
Finally, we did not specially mention trust in our discussion.  The impact of trust in 
interorganizational relationships is well documented [e.g., Chiles and McMackin 1996].  We 
believe that the transaction cost factor “risk” adequately captures the trust component of 
outsourcing governance when firms and vendors engage in long-term contractual relationships.  
Nonetheless, future studies should incorporate trust within the TCT and institutional context to 
examine its relational impact on rational, efficiency-based and non-choice based contract 
governance structures.     
IV. FUTURE RESEARCH AND IMPLICATIONS 
Our framework provides a starting point for understanding when transaction cost and institutional 
explanations will influence outsourcing contracts during various phases of institutionalization.  
There are several research issues that deserve attention.  First and foremost, the propositions put 
forth in this research need to be stated in the form of testable hypotheses, so they could be 
validated empirically.  To do so, it is important to develop and test empirical measures for the key 
constructs in our model.  We have suggested some measures in Table 1.  For example, density 
which is a key construct in several propositions could be measured in terms of the percentage of 
peer firms who have adopted IS outsourcing.  While research in TCT would aid us greatly in 
refining the transaction cost constructs, the institutional theory constructs are perhaps a bit more 
ambiguous and underdeveloped.  Hence, careful attention needs to be paid to refining the 
institutional constructs.  Second, as mentioned earlier, future research needs to consider other 
theoretical perspectives besides TCT as an alternate rational, efficiency-based view and inter-link 
them with the institutional perspective.  For example, the resource-based view could easily  
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Table 1.   Construct Measures 
Construct Potential Measures 
Adoption Binary (adoption or non-adoption) 
Screening Number of screening methods employed and level of screening expenditures. 
Monitoring Number and frequency of reports the firm requests from the vendor. 
Density The percentage of peer firms of interest (e.g., successful firms or firms in the 
professional organization) who have adopted IS outsourcing. 
Rate The percentage of peer firms of interest who have adopted IS outsourcing within a 
given period of time (e.g., month, year, etc.). 
Opportunism Provan and Skinner [1989]; example items include “I have always provided my 
primary supplier a completely truthful picture of my business.” 
Risk Steensma and Corley [2001]; example items include “We have a tendency to support 
projects where the expected returns are certain.” 
Mimetic 
Pressures 
Number of interlocked firms that use the potential outsourcing arrangement under 
consideration by the focal firm OR number of firms within the industry that use the 
potential outsourcing arrangement under consideration by the focal firm. 
Normative 
Pressures 




Emergence of new technologies or abandonment of existing technologies.15 
 
complement the institutional one and aid our understanding of how organizations with unique 
(i.e., strategic) resources respond to institutional pressures in order to maintain their competitive 
advantage.  Third, future research needs to examine the theoretical fit between the decision to 
adopt and corresponding screening and monitoring levels.  For instance, a firm might decide to 
adopt outsourcing based on normative institutional pressures, but then craft monitoring 
mechanisms based on TCT prescriptions.  Although intuition might tell us that such a misfit would 
make outsourcing less effective, future research is needed to examine such assertions.  Fourth, 
future research must investigate the costs of realizing and managing institutional pressures 
depending on the stage of institutionalization for a particular IT outsourcing practice.  It could just 
be that by devoting more resources for realizing and managing institutional pressures, 
organizations may be able to more effectively control costs in screening and monitoring vendors.  
Further research is needed to explore this assumption.  Finally, and more importantly, existing 
research needs to be considered in lieu of the interplay between rational TCT prescriptions and 
non-choice behavior in institutional theory.  In the past, scholars have examined IT outsourcing 
issues ranging from determinants of outsourcing to consequences of outsourcing.  For example, 
besides determinants from the rational TCT view point, what are the possible determinants that 
manifest from the institutional theory perspective?  Similarly, researchers could examine whether 
the presence of strong institutional pressures impact consequences of outsourcing (e.g., cost 
                                                     
15 For the purpose of this research, coercive pressures do not need to be measured.  One only 
needs to know that the deinstitutionalization period has commenced.  The reason for this is that 
the two propositions 3a and 3b for the deinstitutionalization stage state that greater density and 
rate lead to normative institutional pressures being replaced by transaction cost factors.  
Nonetheless, it should be noted that the factors that led to deinstitutionalization can only be 
known after the fact; they could not be known a priori.   
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savings, retention of core competences, etc.).  With a few exceptions, most of the earlier research 
have examined these research questions without due consideration to institutional pressures that 
are inherent in organizational fields.   
Our research has key implications for practitioners.  This study provides an alternative 
explanation to TCT parameters such as bounded rationality, opportunism, and risk traditionally 
considered in IT outsourcing governance.  It is important for managers to realize that there could 
be situations where strong institutional pressures prevail during the three stages of 
institutionalization.  In such scenarios, managers need to assess the density and pace of 
adoption of the IT outsourcing practice of interest.  To do so, managers are wise to allocate 
resources to realize and manage institutional pressures.  Depending on the level of density and 
pace of adoption or de-institutionalization, managers could adhere to corresponding prescriptions 
to IT outsourcing.  In the long run, managers who account for these institutional pressures and 
manage them in light of the rational TCT recommendations are likely to succeed in IT 
outsourcing. 
Specifically, our framework helps managers in deciding whether to outsource and the 
corresponding levels of screening and monitoring.  For example, a bank manager employing an 
ABA-sanctioned vendor might consider appropriate levels advocated by ABA (instead of those 
proscribed by the transaction cost factors) in dealing with the vendor.  As noted earlier, our 
framework can also assist managers to identify the implications of not only the institutional forces 
but also the diffusion processes (i.e., density and rate).   If managers fail to identify the 
institutional pressures, then these pressures might affect them adversely.  For example, 
excessive mimicking of unstable outsourcing technologies may be harmful in the long run as they 
may not suit the focal organization’s context.  Finally, our framework could also assist managers 
in devising strategic responses to manage the institutional environment by understanding how to 
avoid and/or respond to the institutional pressures. 
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